Abstract: The essence of implementing the "three-rights separation" system of homestead is the process of multi-stakeholder game achieving equilibrium. By systematically delving into the differential institutional demands of the central government, local governments, rural collective economic organizations and farmers, and using the method of game theory, this paper tries to examine the complex game process of each subject in the process of implementing the "three-right separation" in the base, and to clarify the game dilemma among multiple subjects and the deep-seated reasons behind it. The results show that the central government and local governments is of an entruster-and-entrustee relationship, and the focus of the game between the two sides is the use of the quota availble after the withdrawal of homestead; The game between local government and farmers is actually a sequential game process. Farmers are in a disadvantaged position in the game and have the behavior of maximizing benefits through strategic choice under the leadership of local government; Rural collective economic organizations are alienated into local government agents, which have interest game behavior and profit-making tendency against farmers. Research conclusion: the establishment of a flexible system, the improving of the relationship between cadres and the masses, the strengthening of the information symmetry mechanism and stepping-up of the supervision mechanism can effectively resolve the dilemma of multi-agent game in the implementation of the "three-right separation" of homestead; In addition to strengthening the construction of the homestead system itself, the effective implementation of the "three-right separation" of rural homestead lies in the promotion of the upgrading of rural governance and continuous optimization of the protection of farmers' rights and interests.